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Abstract This article explores the linkages between domestic affairs and foreign
policies in China in fulfilling its grand ambition of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It
examines the complexities in decision-making process of BBRI^ inside Beijing’s
administration. It departs from the most existing literature on BRI in Europe, which
focus upon the geo-economic and geo-political impacts of the BRI. Instead, it adopts an
Binside-out^ approach by examining the actual policy process with a primary focus to
individual actors such as the Party, the government department and the state-owned
enterprises as well as individual academics. It also disentangles the intricate relations
amongst the Party, the key decision-making institutions and the policy execution
entities in determining the final outcome of the BRI. It will finally reflect the extent
to which Beijing’s bureaucratic complexities have impacted upon the EU and its
member states’ willingness in collaborating or in formally endorsing China’s BRI.
Introduction
Since joining theWTO in 2001, around every 4 years, China has presented the world with a
new concept, strategy or programme. These concepts are deeply rooted in the Chinese
political system, but encapsulated in simple and memorable slogans. They have caused a
great deal of both excitement and confusion abroad andwithin China. Past examples include
‘peaceful rise’, a ‘harmonious world’ and ‘new great power relations’.
The latest arrival is the ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)1’, commonly known as One
Belt, One Road in public. No other policy in the world has launched as many global
debates, with both serious doubts and some enthusiasm seen from academics,
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policymakers and entrepreneurs. In May 2017, Beijing hosted the first ever ‘Belt and
Road Forum’ in its usual lavish and choreographed style, attended by 29 head of states
and delegates from 130 countries, to consolidate what China has achieved so far and to
further promote the initiative (Xinhua 2017).
In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited several Central Asian
republics (Xi 2013). He reiterated China’s intention of pursuing a policy of large-
scale investment. He emphasised the revival of the economic and cultural ties that once
characterised China’s relations with Eurasian countries during the past glory of the Silk
Road, and promoted recreating the Silk Road Economic Belt in connection with the
Maritime Silk Road. But despite the trade statistics, numerous conferences, tailored
financial derivatives and new rail connections, defining the BRI is still difficult for the
world outside China. It remains Blonger on sweeping vision than on nuts-and-bolts
practicalities^ (De Jonquieres 2015).
Global analysts focus on the impact, positive or negative, of this ambitious under-
taking while remaining vague about what BRI is and what aims China are pursuing
through it. Few analysts understand who in Beijing decides on BRI projects and how
the overall budget is distributed through the government.
A key reason for this tendency to overlook the complications of BRI and Chinese
foreign policy decision-making in general is the assumption that China is a static and
authoritarian state where policy is simply dictated from the top. This perception may
have been valid under Mao, but is certainly no longer the case in contemporary China.
Another critical feature of BRI often ignored by pundits is the supremacy of
domestic interests. This initiative is designed mostly to consume China’s excessive
industrial capacity, to secure its long-term energy supply and equally importantly to
stabilise the troublesome Western borders of the Middle Kingdom that have been
threatened by rampant home-grown Islamic jihadists.
This article explores the linkages between domestic affairs and foreign policies in
China in fulfilling its grand ambition of BRI. In particular, it examines the complexities
in decision-making process of BBRI^ inside Beijing’s administration. This contribution
identifies and analyses a selected numbers of key stakeholders in shaping BRI. It also
disentangles the intricate relations amongst the Party, the key decision-making institu-
tions and the policy execution entities in determining the final outcome of the BRI. It
will finally reflect the extent to which Beijing’s bureaucratic complexities have im-
pacted upon the EU and its member states’ willingness in collaborating or in formally
endorsing China’s BRI.
It departs from the most existing literature on BRI in Europe, which focus upon the
geo-economic and geo-political impacts of the BRI. Instead, it adopts an Binside-out^
approach by examining the actual policy process with a primary focus to individual
actors such as the Party, the government department and the state-owned enterprises as
well as individual academics.
To a lesser extent, it also investigates the dynamics amongst the above-mentioned
actors in shaping the policy agenda of the BRI. It utilises the Bureaucratic Politics
Model (BPM) to interpret the policymaking and execution process. It argues that BPM
could well widely apply to interpret the decision-making process of non-Western liberal
democratic government. This piece combines discourse analysis of existing literature
with primary semi-structured elite interviews to illuminate the decision-making pro-
cess. Yet, given its limited space and very broad scope of the BRI, it is impossible to
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examine every single actor involved in the BRI. The author merely aims to provide
some food for thought through a prism of Bureaucratic Politics.
BRI: a container for China’s domestic affairs?
As argued earlier, too many pundits and policy practitioners in the West stress the geo-
economic and geo-political significances of BRI without paying attention to how
domestic politics dictate the policies, budgetary distribution and detail of BRI. No
discussion of major Chinese policy can ignore the ultimate aim of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP): staying in power and keeping absolute control. This requires
stability and in turn requires the CCP keep its ‘social contract’ with ordinary Chinese
people of growth and employment. BRI is no exception.
Against the backdrop of the Chinese economic slowdown and much discussed
efforts economic rebalancing, China is searching for a new engine of economic growth.
In particular, the government is looking for a way to reduce the regional economic
development imbalance, one of the negative legacies left by Deng Xiaoping’s landmark
reforms. BRI has become key to this, connecting China’s diverse regional development
and revival programmes such Developing the Great West, Raising the Central Region
and Revitalise The Old Northeast Industrial Bases.2
To this extent, one could argue that BRI is not a brand new initiative that was created
by President Xi and his team overnight. Rather, it serves as a ‘bag’ or ‘container’ that
virtually everything can be thrown into. Since the convening of the Central Financial
and Economic Conference in December 2014, where the launch of the BRI initiative
was officially decided, all 31 provincial level governments from Hainan to Hei
Longjiang have scrambled to list their preferred projects and industries to be supported
by BRI (Xinhua 2015). Some foreign pundits and even President Xi himself have
commented on its lack of clarity (Xi 2016).
In a broader sense, BRI is seen as an essential element of China’s further economic
reform process itself. It was explicitly linked to the economic reforms of the Third
Plenum of the 18th Party Congress, which focused on market allocation of resources
with discussions indicating the senior leadership’s thinking (Xi 2014). To this extent,
BRI may also offer an ‘upgraded’ version of China’s ‘Go Global’ strategy of making
overseas investments, infrastructure building, and conducting mergers and acquisitions,
mostly by the Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Chinese SOEs played a crucial
role in the ‘Go Global’ strategy, but despite their advantage of sheer size, they remain
short of global business exposure and corporate governance. The Chinese leadership
intends to use BRI as an efficient vehicle to deepen its reforms to debt-laden SOEs and
further their global footprint.
The BRI aspires to consume the excessive industrial capacity triggered by govern-
mental intervention and underperforming Chinese companies. Ironically, it could also
further exacerbate this longstanding symptom of the current economic structure
established by Beijing. Regardless of the type of BRI project, participating companies
2 A collection of different slogans and initiatives were advocated by the Chinese Communist Party and the
Chinese government.
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are most likely to base their production model on the assumption of successful
implementation of BRI.
However, the eventual success of delivering OBOR projects is not only dependent
on China’s financial resources and political capital but also equally importantly deter-
mined by the willingness of foreign partners. Both Beijing and Chinese participants
must have a well thought out plan B to avoid waste in financial resources and
manpower if some OBOR projects do not come to fruition.
The bureaucratic politics and China’s belt and road initiative
The Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) is an actor-oriented approach that has been widely
debated and utilised amongst IR academics (Alden and Aran 2011; Allison 1971; Freeman
1976; Halperin and Claap 1974; Halpern 1992; Hermann and Hermann 1989). Scholars
often employ the BPM to analyse the foreign policies of liberal democracies. However, this
article aims to challenge the prevalent view and to demonstrate that the BPM is by nomeans
limited to a certain category of political system. It is possessed with great explanatory value
when it is used to examine foreign policies regardless of the type of regime.
Chinese foreign policymaking is perhaps the world most complex decision-making
process, due to the scope of issues, interaction between the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) and the Government, and diversity of interests and views. The launch and the
management of BRI in the past 4 years have accurately reflected these intricacies.
The BPM is at its best to explain those intricacies despite BPM has emerged from a
Western political science discourse. The BPM, according to Graham Allison, ‘the
government is neither a rational actor nor a conglomerate of loosely allied organisa-
tions, but many individuals representing different government departments participat-
ing in a competitive game’ (Allison 1971).
The name of the game is politics where players in a certain position bargain via the
established channels in a hierarchical government. By using BPM to interpret foreign
policymaking process, the end result of foreign policy is neither a rational choice nor
the outcome of an organisational process, rather the result of pulling and hauling and
internal bargaining skills of different organs and their representatives.
This result depends on the respective power, position within the government and
bargaining skills of different organs and their representatives. Top leaders decide on their
stance towards and proposals for particular issues according to what is at stake for their
particular department under specific conditions. In other words, as Allison and Freeman
pointed out, Bwhere you stand depends on where you sit^ (Ibid; Freeman 1976).
Yet, there is a key difference between Western bureaucratic politics and the Chinese
political system. The former occurs amongst various administrative government de-
partment whereas the latter intertwines between the Party and the Government. And
when a policy dispute arises, a particular official or a government department’s Party
ranking holds a big sway. As what the Party Constitution states, Bthe Party commands
the overall situation and coordinates the efforts of all quarters… and the Party must play
the role as the core leadership among all other organizations at the corresponding
levels^ (CCP Constitution 2017).
As a result, final decision of foreign policymaking and other decision-making power
concentrates in the hands of the CCP. This fits into what the Chinese Premier Zhou
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Enlai once proclaimed, BThere is no small issue in diplomacy, all power belongs to the
Central Committee^ (Zhou 1990).3
The Party has an omnipresent role in every aspect of policymaking within the
Chinese political system. Foreign policy and the advocacy of BRI are no exceptions.
The seven members of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo (SCP) and the
State Council generally set key the strategic guidelines, or long-term policy goals, of
China’s foreign affairs; however, more specific policy measures are mostly made and
implemented by the various governmental ministries and state owned corporations. The
making of the Chinese foreign policy has become an increasingly crowded playground
for various equally powerful stakeholders competing for their departmental interests,
like in any Western democracy.
China’s foreign policy formulation has become increasingly pluralistic compared to
the one of Mao’s era. A process of decentralisation in decision-making has occurred
since the 1978 Economic Reforms. As a result, there has been no single bureaucratic
body that has supreme authority over the others when it comes to making certain
decisions. Almost all bureaucracies and other players have utilised their resources and
expertise to gain access to the highest level of Party elites in the search for more
political clout and greater budgetary power.
Vested interest groups have played a significant part in the Chinese political system
since 1978. As Graham Allison argued in his interpretation of the Cuban Missile crisis,
whilst the rules of game might play out very differently in a democratic elected
government, the fundamental characteristics of bureaucratic competition remain the
same regardless of the type of government (Allison 1969; Halperin 1974).
One can argue that the BPM is largely applicable to liberal democracies with multi-
party systems to satisfy the electorates’ interests. Therefore, there are numerous interest
groups across the whole political spectrum, which are making many attempts to shape
the FP according to their desired outcomes. China, as an authoritarian state, is conven-
tionally perceived as monolithic and therefore does not have interest groups which could
oppose or influence decisions made by the Standing Committee of the Politburo (SCP).
However, the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics, described by Graham Allison and
Morton Halperin has not restricted its application to a particular political system, and vested
interest groups do play a significant part across through the Chinese political system.
The relevance of BPM to interpreting Chinese political system is twofold. Firstly,
almost every domestic or external affairs decision made are based on a desire to achieve
a consensus amongst the seven or nine members of the SCP, even if such consensus is
sometimes merely an illusion. This consensus-seeking model has provided a unique
opportunity to those potential interest groups seeking to influence the opinions of SCP
members. Bargaining scenarios have often occurred in a process of consensus seeking
amongst interest groups.
These interest groups maybe located both inside and outside of the formal FP
making process. They mainly consist of governmental institutions, Chinese companies
and even some foreign corporate organisations to a smaller extent. They attempt to
formulate Chinese foreign policy based on their departmental preferences and corporate
interests respectively. More importantly, none of current seven members of the SCP
have much experience in foreign policymaking. This in turn has provided relevant
3 Zhou Enlai’s own words in 1955
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Chinese foreign policy actors more channels and alternatives in which to shape
Beijing’s agenda.
Secondly, Chinese FP has increased in scope and content which has created fertile
ground for the various stakeholders and interest groups to compete to shape the policy
agenda via various channels.
Like implementation of any Chinese policy, the cornerstones are laid on the
domestic front. Dramatic changes in the distribution of power and devolution of
authority within Chinese bureaucracies have been happening since Deng Xiaoping’s
momentous economic reforms.
BRI is one of the best illustrations, perhaps the best, of institutional power distribu-
tion below the top Party Leadership.
Central ministries and provincial governments have scrambled to give BRI a
meaning, gauge what it means for them and most importantly, how BRI could be used
to get hold of or justify the use of project funds.
Many old ‘China hands’, such as Kenneth Lieberthal, Alice Miller and Elisabeth
Economy, still dispute who makes Chinese foreign policy and why there are so many
new institutions with obscure names proliferating across the Chinese foreign policy
formation process (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992; Miller 2014; Economy 2014). The
answers to these questions are far from clear. Neither China observers in the West nor the
home-grown scholars in China have given satisfactory responses (Lu 1997; Zhang 2014).
The advocacy of BRI has also triggered the same confusion like the making of
Beijing’s foreign policy. It is suffering from a lack of policy and bureaucratic coordi-
nation. Xi’s ambitious initiative raises two key questions for Beijing and its BRI
partners and loan providers: Which departments or ministries carry the overall respon-
sibility for BRI? What are the selection criteria for categorising infrastructure projects
as parts of the initiative?
Besides setting broad policy priorities, the top leadership can determine the survival
of any particular institutions. The Party can create a new bureaucratic framework, or
assign and redistribute responsibilities and budgetary powers between existing agen-
cies. However, such a restructuring process has not occurred on a regular basis.
What’s more common are ‘reshuffles’ driven by issues and policy priorities. More
often than not, an existing institution challenges the authority of any newly established
organisation which may share competencies and budgetary powers. The Party will
‘award’ or ‘punish’ the challengers according to the situation and policy domains. This
case has also largely applied to the pursuit of BRI.
According to the official document published in 2015, the lead organisation for
coordinating efforts to pursue the initiative is the National Development and Reforma-
tion Commission (NDRC) with some shared responsibility from the Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NDRC 2015).
NDRC remains the most powerful institution in Beijing’s central administration,
probably the most powerful in China’s macroeconomic policymaking in general.
However, there is a key difference between the policy in the official document and
practice in the corridors of power at the ‘Court of Zhongnanhai’.
Using the normal CCP bureaucratic procedure, a ‘Small Leading Group’ has been
set up for coming to key decisions on BRI. This group, consisting of the most senior
policymakers and meeting monthly, is for tackling difficult and outstanding issues
when disagreements arise and final judgments are required.
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The Small Leading Group for OBOR is based at the State Council and chaired by
Zhang Gaoli, Standing Committee Member of the Party. Four deputy chairs share
responsibilities equally:
& Wang Yang, the Deputy Premier in charge of Economic and Trade issues
& Wang Huning, Head of Policy Planning for the CCP and the so-called chief advisor
for Xi4
& Yang Jiechi, the State Councillor for Foreign Affairs
& Yang Jing, the Secretary General for the State Council.
Looking at the chair and deputy chairs alongside the official policy paper, can we
really say that the NDRC is leading the policy? It has no power to override the decisions
of any of the five chairs. It has become ‘sandwiched’ between the Small Leading Group
and the relevant central ministries. Each of the five chairs has their corresponding
ministries to brief. It is almost impossible for the ministries to speak with one voice.
Apart from the above four mentioned ministries and Small Leading Group, there are
other 15 different ministries and agencies that hold the lion’s share of votes in the
central government, influencing which projects are chosen to be part of OBOR.
It would be naive to assume that theMinistry of Finance andMinistry of Transportation
have similar views while selecting high-speed railway projects across OBOR-related
countries. The former looks for project with a solid return on investment, and the host
country’s potential financial risks and credibility for loans, whereas the latter looks for
companies that can build high-speed railway tracks within the shortest period of time.
Nearly 32 provinces across China are also participating in ensuring their preferred
projects being chosen. In doing so, each provincial government will receive a generous
budgetary support in developing the chosen projects. Some provinces have begun to
form alliances with certain central ministries to bid for project approvals, while other
provincial governors and some CEOs of the State Owned Enterprises have taken to
bypassing central ministries and communicating directly with the members of the Small
Leading Group to gain their approvals.
A crucial reason why a selected number of provincial governors and CEOs of state-
owned enterprise can bypass the central administration for project approvals is because
they outrank some ministers within the Party. Even though in the hierarchy of the state
they cannot influence ministers, their party seniority holds huge sway.
For example, the Minister of Transportation is not a member of Politburo and ranks
No. 41 within the Central Committee of the CCP whereas the provincial governor of
Chongqing5 (an important Western Municipality) ranks No. 14 in the Central Commit-
tee and is a member of Politburo. In practical terms therefore, the governor of Chong-
qing can override the decisions made by a government minister in relation to OBOR.
This bureaucratic opaqueness and overarching policy-related uncertainty presents a
major obstacle in China’s efforts to convince the foreign partners to make a monetary or
political investment in OBOR without providing an ultimate underwriter.
Deng described his ethos for reform in 1978 as Bcrossing rivers by feeling the stones^
(Deng 1983). Xi has clearly adopted this approach in leading BRI. However, Deng used
4 Both Wang Yang and Wang Huning elevated as standing committee members of the CCP in Octo 2017
5 Please refer to the name list of 19th CPC Central Committee
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this tactic when China was isolated in the immediate aftermath of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, whereas Xi needs the involvement of over 60 countries for his vision.
Beijing’s lack of a clearly defined set of guidelines for the BRI development suits the
Chinese pragmatic approach, which allows the Party and the government simply to
shift plans during the implementation process whenever new opportunities arise.
However, to fully engage with other stakeholders, China must invent a bureaucratic
framework with reasonable consistency, setting up clear criteria for selecting potential
projects that are credit worthy. This consistency must be spelt out loud and clear, and
practiced diligently to reassure partners. Beijing is still at a very early stage of getting its
house into good order on BRI, and Xi must tidy up quickly.
BRI expertise shortage both in academia and state-owned enterprises
As discussed earlier, this article focuses on each individual foreign policy actor within a
BPM model. Both individual academics and Chinese state-owned enterprises should be
treated as individual analytical unit when one assess the BRI from an Binside-out^ approach.
Expertise providence has become a permanent feature of decision-making in Chi-
nese foreign policy as well as a vehicle to influence the most senior leadership in power
corridor in Beijing.
In particular, very few of the current members of the CCP Central Committee
possesses a good understanding of geo-political and geo-economic complexities of
countries which potentially participate in BRI, even if some of them are foreign affairs
background or economists by training. They have always made decisions based on the
knowledge of expert and academia. Such obsession with expertise has largely reflected
some Chinese scholars ‘works (Lu 1997; Zhang 2016).
However, an imminent challenge for BRI’s success derives from inside China.
China is not yet equipped with an extensive network of home-grown experts who have
strong command of knowledge of the regions within the BRI framework.
According to the proposed BRI development plan, infrastructure investments and
connectivity projects will run through more than 60 countries across Central Asia,
Europe, West Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Apart from a large number of
engineers, evaluating the viabilities of BRI projects requires geopolitical strategists who
know the respective regions inside-out, it needs financial experts to understand the host
countries’ fiscal and monetary policies, and it needs demand project management teams
having special knowledge of the local labour market.
However, at the moment, there are only a handful (less than 20) Central Asia and
Middle East specialists inside China who are closely following the geopolitical situa-
tion within the two regions.6 Most of those experts have no direct access to the key
government officials, influential academics, and business leaders of countries in Central
Asia and the Middle East. Much of their existing research outputs are based on arbitrary
collections of evidence rather than systematic analyses of the target countries.
Despite Chinese SOEs are determined to profit from Beijing’s BRI and become
some of the most important players in world economic affairs, however, their close
6 Interview with Chinese academics who are familiar with the subject
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association and somewhat submissive relationship with the CCP and the Chinese
government have impeded their overseas business plans.
UnlikeWestern multinational companies, the CCP and the government either at central
or province level determine the Chinese SOEs’ corporate strategies and investment plans
under the BRI. Instead, each company’s party secretary usually possesses final decision-
making power to initiate corporate strategies. Given their direct ties to the government, it is
difficult to judge whether SOEs’ BRI investment plans are political decisions or based
purely on commercial merit. Their close links with the state have become a double-edged
sword for Chinese SOEs, not only providing financial support for potential BRI projects
but also hindering growth and profit-making in foreign markets, where their direct links
with Beijing have often provoked suspicions and hostility.
Most of the senior management teams of large Chinese SOEs who may potentially
engage with BRI-related projects are appointed by the Party’s Organisation Depart-
ment7 and equipped with industrial expertise, but not the necessary management skills
and general market knowledge of the host countries. For example, they are usually
unfamiliar with the market environments of host countries with little understanding of
local labour union politics.
SOEs may hire leading global professional services firms to develop their potential
OBOR projects. Some Chinese companies believe that outsourcing professional ser-
vices firms is equivalent to possessing sound project management skills themselves and
therefore readiness to pursue OBOR projects. Chinese companies utilise professional
services firms mostly on the basis of their reputations rather than their specific
knowhow. In part, this reflects the fact that engaging such major multinationals is often
primarily a signal of their determination to pursue OBOR projects in line with central
government objectives.
The BRI relevance to the EU members state and the China-EU relations
In an era when the Europeans seem incapable of resolving one severe crisis after
another, Beijing will undoubtedly adjust its bilateral relations with the UK and reassess
the value of its partnerships with other EU member states and Brussels. With respect to
the emerging geo-political struggles in Asia, Europe remains disengaged. Nor has it
shown any interest to get involved in the global power struggles between Beijing and
Washington. Instead, China is seen almost exclusively in economic terms as an
opportunity for European service-oriented economies and a threat to jobs in European
manufacturing sectors. Thus, China’s recent economic rebalancing has served as a
major source of conflict between Beijing and Brussels.
Despite the multiple ongoing crises in Europe, China’s EU policy still focuses on
gaining access to the vast markets there in order to pursue its immediate economic
activities, including its campaign of the BRI. Beijing also continues to flex its economic
muscles and apply the well-practiced ‘divide and rule’ strategy in its dealings with EU
member states regardless of their sizes. In particular, Beijing puts strong emphasis on
courting Central and Eastern European countries with its ‘16 + 1’ cooperation
7 An administrative department run by the CCP to appoint the most senior ministerial-level officials and CEOs
of most important SOEs and state owned banks.
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framework, which has shown significant potential for generating a strong pro-China
lobby within the EU (CEEC Summit 2017).
However, the European political elites must be aware that Beijing has devised
several tactics to attain its economic diplomacy goals, which have also become more
complex as a result of China’s ongoing and much-needed efforts to transform the
domestic economy. In particular, the ambitious ‘Belt and Road Initiative/BRI’ under the
aegis of President Xi Jinping is confusing and creates ambiguities rather than incentives
for EU member states to engage in further collaborations.
For instance, with a view towards revamping its EU policy agenda, Beijing has
intertwined this initiative with domestic players, who, however, are little known to the
European policymakers. This type of change in bureaucratic management will only
exacerbate the already tenuous EU-China relations.
BRI causes a great deal of confusion for the EU member states and Brussels. Even a
country like the UK, while it focuses upon post-Brexit relations with the EU, it also
turns its eyes to play a greater role in participating in China’s BRI8 (UK House of
Commons, FA Ctte 2017). Beyond the trade statistics and new rail connections, the role
of the BRI is not yet entirely clear for Europe.
Nevertheless, several EU member states have pledged their support for the initiative.
Subsequently, in boasts picked up by the media and official papers, they spoke of their
respective exclusive roles in the BRI initiative. There was talk of German and Polish
railway connections, a historical route linking Venice to the ancient Silk Road, and
even China’s new plan to use the Piraeus port in Greece as the European receiving line
of the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road. There was also talk of the City of
London setting up a RMB Internationalisation centre with an exclusive focus to the
BRI infrastructure projects.9
Beijing’s policy objective vis-à-vis the EU is representative of the fundamental
characteristics of Chinese foreign policy. China is a country with ‘dual identities’,
combining a developing country reality with the power ambitions of a great global
power. This particularity has created ‘issue-oriented national interests, which can easily
conflict with the type of value-based relationship most preferred by the EU’ (Zhang
2009:123). The dual-identity status influences Beijing’s foreign policy in that it focuses
on satisfying immediate economic needs rather than attaining long-term strategic goals.
Despite the UK’s vote to exit, China’s issue-oriented foreign policy agenda will remain
unchanged when it engages in the future with an independent UK and the EU.
China and the EU differ fundamentally in their manner of organising international
affairs. The EU prefers that international politics be organised under a rule-based
system, whereas China holds a Hobbesian view on power, which is all about absolute
sovereignty, stability and control. It is therefore not surprising that Beijing’s current EU
policy has largely failed to overcome two of its biggest obstacles: obtaining market
economy status (MES) and lifting the arms embargo. These two issues are as much
about rules as well as about power. The strains show no sign of abating and illustrate
that closer bilateral trade ties alone cannot achieve a political strategic partnership as
both sides had originally hoped for.
8 The author served as an expert witness to UK-China Trade Relations inquiry at the UK Commons Foreign
Affairs Committee, 28th March 2017.
9 Interview with City of London Asia Representative
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For many years, China’s engagements with the EU have largely reflected its rapid
economic growth as well as its rising international profile on global affairs. Decision-
makers in Beijing are very clear on what China wants from the EU: (1) free access to
the European Single Market; (2) a secure home for its investments and, in particular, a
willing partner for China’s fast-growing acquisition of overseas assets; and (3) a
meaningful diplomatic alternative to its increasingly fractious relationship with the US.
Meanwhile, China’s rising international profile and relentless pursuits in its eco-
nomic statecraft have further complicated its policy towards the EU at both levels of
policymaking and policy implementation. The Union’s timid response towards
Beijing’s grand ambition of BRI indicates well this lack of mutual trust and Europe’s
insufficient understanding of Beijing’s foreign affairs practices. Without reforms and a
changed mind-set on both sides, such policy-related complexities will continue to
hamper China’s relations with Brussels and the individual EU member states.
But despite these reasonable expressions of enthusiasm, the overall European
response has remained reticent. Under the lens of bureaucratic politics, the ambitious
initiative under the aegis of President Xi Jinping raises the following key questions that
Beijing must answer to its potential partners: Which departments or ministries shall
carry the overall responsibilities for BRI? And what are the selection criteria for
categorising infrastructure projects as parts of the initiative?
Based on a conventional view from Europe, China is a unitary and centralised power
renowned for its long-term strategic planning and rational foreign policy agenda. Under
the current Chinese government structure, this picture lost its validity. Almost all
institutions in the central leadership and local governments are involved in foreign
relations to different degrees, and it is almost impossible for these ministries and
agencies to see China’s national interests the same way or to speak with one voice. This
failure to streamline confuses not only outsiders but also the Chinese people themselves.
The EU and its member states should recognise that the scope and contents of
Chinese foreign policies have expanded enormously since China joined the WTO.
Certain policy domains, such as climate diplomacy, foreign aid and international
financial governance, have only recently emerged as policy priorities for the CCP.
However, since the top leadership does not have enough expertise on its own or
sufficient time to make the ‘right’ decision on the individual items of its expanded
foreign policy agenda, those agencies and organisations that already possess strong
expertise in relevant areas have become prominent and influential by means of
providing expert advice and policy recommendations.
Besides traditional foreignpolicyactors, suchas theMinistryofForeignAffairs (MFA)and
theMinistryofCommerce (MOFCOM), thenewexperts include institutions like thePeople’s
Bank of China and theNational Reformation andDevelopment Commission (NDRC).
These experts in the background act either semi-autonomously or autonomously.
They have built up their own centre of gravity in their attempts to shape Beijing’s EU
policy agenda. On the international stage, they have become the de facto decision-
makers on behalf of the Party and the state. However, the flow of information derived
from them creates a different set of problems for the Chinese government to carry
forward a crucial initiative such as the BRI, as most of the new players have no vision
of China’s foreign affairs and therefore send confusing signals to the outside world.
The bureaucratic opaqueness and overarching policy-related uncertainties of the BRI
present a major obstacle in China’s efforts to convince the relevant European partners to
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make a monetary contribution to any infrastructure projects that would potentially
mobilise their enormous financial resources without providing them with an ultimate
underwriter to guarantee their investments.
For example, The EU-China Fund jointly established by European Investment Bank
and the newly created Silk Road Fund has reflected this strong sense of reticence from
the European side.10 The fund itself initially wished to be integrated into part of
BJuncker Plan^ (EIF 2017). Despite the political agreement between Beijing and
Brussels, there has been little indication that EU-China Fund is ready to take off.11
Therefore, to engage with the EU on the BRI, China must actively promote a unified
narrative of its vision and communicate the details of its plan on both a political and an
entrepreneurial level. Beijing’s lack of a clearly defined set of guidelines for the OBOR
development suits the Chinese pragmatic approach, which allows the Party simply to
shift plans during the implementation process whenever new opportunities arise.
However, this approach generates ambiguities for Europeans, who are their targeted
partners amongst other continents. Therefore, Beijing’s lack of clarity regarding the
OBOR initiative jeopardises any potential projects with the EU.
Conclusion
BRI is very much in line with the distinctive Chinese character of past grand initiatives.
That is fluid in nature, opaque in implementation plan and flexible in concrete measures
of projects. Such unique features are well understood and practiced by Chinese political
elites in their corridor of power, yet frustrate foreign partners both at the governmental
level and in entrepreneurial communities outside China.
China is in dire need of a sophisticated diplomacy and communication strategy in
order to keep pace with its own newly acquired global power status. It needs new
rhetoric that clearly spells out its coordinated foreign policy and the way it streamlines
proliferations of bureaucratic actors involved in policymaking.
It is important for the Chinese leadership to not become too Sino-obsessed and to
retain a keen interest in what others want, expect or fear from their interactions with
China under the BRI framework. Like many other issues in China’s foreign affairs, it
should not be forgotten that BRI, whilst clearly dependent on Chinese objectives and
actions, is also dependent on how others interpret these objectives and how they act on
these interpretations.
Europe’s political elite must remember that the people in charge of the BRI are
groomed and trained within the system. It is therefore advisable to respect this
continuity: the more the Europeans do today to engage the Chinese political elite in
constructive debate on the initiative, the greater their chances are for future policies and
the maturation of the BRI that will reflect European interests. The EU needs to devote
more resources to understanding China and its ever-changing complex bureaucratic
decision-making process, like China did with the EU at the beginning of Millennium.12
10 Author’s Interview with staff members at EIB and Silk Road Fund in Beijing, 2017.
11 Confirmed by a senior journalist in Brussels and an official in Beijing
12 Author’s interview with Zhou Hong, the former Director or European Institute, Chinese Academy of Social
Science, Beijing, 2017
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Close scrutiny of the official BRI document published in 2015 reveals it to be largely
an effort to advertise the BRI initiative. It suggests the proposed achievements of the
initiative at the economic and strategic level, rather than referring any concrete meth-
odology to achieve them. The document does not offer any time frame or deadline, and
more importantly, does not suggest any business model to make the initiative work.
Sooner or later, the Chinese government must have concrete answers to fill in those
conspicuous omissions if BRI is going to be a success. The 19th CCP Congress
Political Report further stressed the centrality of BRI in relations towards China’s
foreign policy (CCP 2017). Yet, how much it can achieve is remain to be seen.
A central challenge to any future Chinese leadership will be how to develop a global
foreign policy and respond to concerns in regions that are historically little known in
China, but will affect and be affected by the country’s economic growth. In order to
improve its global diplomacy, China needs to draw on policies that go beyond the
simple purposes of securing China’s own economic interests. One hopes Beijing will
learn this very quickly from its long march to the new Silk Road.
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